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Professional incompetence,




It is obvious that the right to legal representation, guaranteed in s 35 of
the Constitution of the Republic of South Africa must include competent
legal representation. The right to legal representation is traditionally
viewed as a pre-requisite for the protection of the privilege against
self-incrimination.1 If this line of reasoning is pursued it follows that
competent legal representation is required to uphold the privilege
against self-incrimination. But the following questions arise: how does
a court determine incompetence and when will incompetence render
a trial unfair?
In each jurisdiction the contours of rights are constrained and shaped
by social, economic, historical and political contexts. For example,
in South Africa the right to legal representation is not a substantive
right unless substantive injustice would result if there was no legal
representation. The South African constitution embodies an express
rejection of the abuse of state powers that characterised the apartheid
regime and consequently the privilege against self-incrimination is
not a right to be taken lightly. However, historical context would also
indicate that coercion is the primary wrong to be guarded against. In
the absence of coercion it is not clear that the privilege against self-
incrimination is infringed when an incriminating statement is made
voluntarily in the mistaken belief that it is not incriminating nor that a
fair trial is breached in the absence of competent legal representation.
The case of S v Saloman2 provides an interesting factual matrix in
which to explore these questions.
The appellant was contacted by a policeman (whom he knew) who
said he wanted to speak to the appellant in connection with a robbery.
The appellant took himself to the police station to discuss the matter
with the investigating officer. At the police station the appellant was
BA (Wits) LLB LLM (Natal) LLD (Stell); Dean of Law and Professor in the Faculty of
Law, University of Cape Town.
1 See PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe Principles of Evidence 3ed (2009) 121 et
seq.
2 2014 (1) SACR 93 (WCC).
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placed under arrest and advised of his rights. He then phoned Mr J,
an attorney and asked him to come to the police station and act as
his legal representative. Mr J went to the police station but was kept
waiting by the appellant for 45 minutes as the appellant wished to carry
on his conversation with the investigating officer. When Mr J had the
opportunity to interview the appellant, his client, the appellant advised
him that he had not been involved in the robbery and that he had
transported the 'robbers' merely as part of his ordinary taxi activities.
The appellant was then advised of his rights by MrJ and it was agreed
that he would make an exculpatory statement to the police. When
brought before a peace officer to make his statement, the appellant
was further interrogated as to whether he was making his statement
voluntarily. The appellant then proceeded to make an incriminating
statement somewhat different to the one that he discussed with his legal
representative. His representative did not intervene, the matter went
to trial and the appellant was convicted on the basis of the statement
he made to the police. He then appealed against his conviction on the
basis that if he had been granted competent legal representation he
would never have made the incriminating statement. The appeal court,
endorsing the approach taken by the United States Supreme Court
that effective legal representation was essential to trial fairness in an
adversarial system, held that MrJ's failure to intervene once he realised
that this client was making an incriminating statement, amounted to
ineffective legal representation which resulted in an infringement of
the accused's right not to incriminate himself and consequently he was
denied the right to a fair trial.
2 Adversarialism and legal ethics
Proponents of the adversarial system claim that the pursuit of truth
and the protection of rights are 'best achieved through partisan
presentations of competing interest'. 3 In America, adversarialism
also gives expression to a strong commitment to capitalism and
individualism.4 It is in this context that competent legal representation
is a pre-requisite for a fair trial and in which a legal representative is
required to put his or her client's interests above all other interests.
Should this be the same in South Africa, where the commitment to
capitalism ostensibly is not as strong and individualism is tempered by
the values of ubuntu?
3 DL Rhodes Ethics in Practice (2000) 8.
4 See C Menkel-Meadow 'The limits of adversarial ethics' in Rhodes op cit (n3)
25. Generally, see also GC Hazard and A Dondi Legal Ethics (2004) and C Banks
CriminalJustice Ethics 3ed (2013).
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These values were explained by Mokgoro J as follows. Generally,
ubuntu translates as 'humaneness'. In its most fundamental sense it
translates as personhood and 'morality'. Metaphorically, it expresses
itself in umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu, describing the significance
of group solidarity on survival issues so central to the survival of
communities. While it envelops the key values of group solidarity,
compassion, respect, human dignity, conformity to basic norms and
collective unity, in its fundamental sense it denotes humanity and
morality. Its spirit emphasises a respect for human dignity, marking
a shift from confrontation to conciliation. In South Africa ubuntu
has become a notion with particular resonance in the building of a
democracy. It is part of our rainbow heritage, though it might have
operated and still operates differently in diverse community settings. In
the Western cultural heritage, respect and the value for life, manifested
in the all-embracing concepts of 'humanity' and 'menswaardigheid',
are also highly priced. It is values like these that (s 39(1)(a)) requires
to be promoted. They give meaning and texture to the principles of a
society based on freedom and equality.
5
The court in Port Elizabeth Municipality v Various Occupiers
6
expanded as follows:
'The spirit of ubuntu, part of the deep cultural heritage of the majority
of the population, suffuses the whole constitutional order. It combines
individual rights with a communitarian philosophy. It is a unifying motif of
the Bill of Rights, which is nothing if not a structured, institutionalised and
operational declaration in our evolving new society of the need for human
interdependence, respect and concern.'
It is useful to explore this question as to whether ubuntu might
influence the application of professional ethics by focusing on the
privilege against self-incrimination as this is viewed as fundamental
to the right to a fair trial. Recognising that the criminal justice system
is coercive there can be no doubt that protecting the privilege against
self-incrimination is an important protection for all persons. But does
this require a defence lawyer to put his client's interests above all else?
7
The argument that the client's interest trumps all, has the potential
to turn a trial into an irrational battle where truth-finding becomes
5 S vMakwanyane 1995 (6) BCLR 665 (CC) at para [308].
6 2005 (1) SA 217 (CC) at para [37]. See also City of Johannesburg Metropolitan
Municipality v Blue Moonlight Properties 39 (Pty) Ltd 2012 (2) SA 104 (CC) at para
[38].
7 R Wasserstrom 'Lawyers as professionals: some moral issues' in M Davis and F
EllistonEthics and theLegalProfession (1986) 114 -122, believes so. See also S Pepper
'The lawyers amoral ethical role: a defense, a problem, and some possibilities' in D
Luban (ed) The Ethics of Lawyers (1994) 57.
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irrelevant. 8 If the truth-seeking function of the criminal process is
overlooked there is an increased risk of the criminal justice system
losing the requisite levels of legitimacy for it to function. In certain
circumstances placing the clients' interests above all else could be said
to undermine the dignity of a legal representative, particularly when
it requires him or her to be complicit with the clients mendacity. For
example, the court in Saloman dismissed Mr J's explanation for his
failure to intervene and did not address Mr J's ethical concerns about
putting words into his client's mouth. The court did not recognise the
existence of any ethical dilemma in its finding that Mr J, if competent,
would have protected his client from voluntarily telling the truth.
The counter-argument is that because of the complexities and
inequality in positions of power an accused can only exercise his
autonomy with the assistance of a legal representative. 9 Consequently,
the legal representative's dignity must be sacrificed for the greater good.
Following this line of reasoning an incompetent legal representative
will diminish an accused's autonomy.
If a client misleads his legal representative he breaks the trust which
is at the core of the relationship between lawyer and client and it is
this which makes the Saloman case so different from the examples
cited by the court and the hypothetical examples found in ethics
texts. The standard ethical issue arises when the legal representative
becomes aware that his or her client is lying to the court or police, not
when it appears that the client has lied to him or her and is now telling
the truth to the police or the court. Current standards of legal ethics
do not allow a legal representative to expose his or her client's lies
(whether this should be the case is an argument for a different day).
It is not clear that professional ethics require a legal representative to
actively discourage his or her client from telling the truth when the
client has voluntarily embarked on that journey and where the client
has been advised of his or her rights.
Clearly, if a legal representative advises a client not to make a
statement and the client chooses to do so the link between the legal
representatives' skill and the client's autonomy is at least temporarily
broken. However, it will not permanently sever the skill-autonomy link
as the lawyer remains the instrument of the client, however the client
runs the risk that his or her legal representative will no longer be able
to assist in optimising his or her decision making. The client having
assumed this risk, surely must bear the consequences of it - unless there
is some policy reason to transfer the risk to the prosecution. Ubuntu
s See Banks op cit (n4); WS Simon 'The ideology of advocacy: procedural justice and
professional ethics' in D Luban op cit (n7) 179.
9 See Pepper op cit (n7).
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insofar as it encourages respect between citizens and communitarian
values would seem incompatible with the suppression of knowledge that
might assist in the resolution of a dispute. Ubuntu does not trump the
privilege against self-incrimination, however it is something that should
be taken into account when determining the breadth of the privilege.
Whether a breach of the constitutional right to competent legal
representation on its own provides sufficient reason to place the risk of
exclusion of evidence onto the prosecution is explored further below.
3 Incompetence
The court in Saloman drew on American jurisprudence in determining
what constituted incompetence.10 Although there is little that turns
on it in the present argument it should be noted that the right to
legal representation in America is a substantive right, whereas it only
becomes a substantive right in terms of the South African Constitution
if 'substantive injustice would otherwise result'. 1 The adversarial
nature of proceedings in America is also not tempered by the
inquisitorial elements present in the South African system. The facts of
the American cases referred to by the court in Saloman were somewhat
different to those that the court was dealing with, nevertheless, it is
clear that the American courts have taken a robust approach to the
right to competent legal representation. Similarly, the South African
courts have held that an accused's right to a fair trial will be infringed
'[i]f the unwanted or inept advice of counsel improperly or unfairly
thwarted his exercise of that right'.1 2 As there are many instances in
which a legal representative is required to act, an omission in certain
circumstances could certainly amount to incompetence. The Supreme
Court of Appeal has also held that in each instance incompetence will
be a question of fact - however, where the act complained of is one
which would ordinarily fall within counsel's discretion then 'the scope
for complaint is limited'.1 3 If a legal representative acts in a manner
that results in an accused's constitutional right being infringed then
that too must amount to incompetence.
4 Within counsel's discretion
An 'act' will fall within counsel's discretion if there is a choice of more
than one rational act in the circumstances. 'Act' here is shorthand for
10 See Strickland v Washington 466 US 668 (1984); Wiggins v Smith 539 US 510 (2003);
Rompilla v Beard 545 US 374 (2005).
n Section 35(2)(c) and s 35(3)(g).
12 S v Tandwa 2008 (1) SACR 613 (SCA) at para [8].
13 S vHalgryn 2002 (2) SACR 211 (SCA) at para [14].
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the legal strategies a legal representative may employ in representing
his or her client. The rationality of an act will be determined by
whether it promotes the client's interest.
In the Saloman case the appellant had been advised of his rights,
he knew he need not make a statement and that if he did make a
statement, whatever he said could be used against him. There was no
evidence of police coercion and the judgment does not indicate that
the appellant felt intimated by the situation he found himself in. He
simply chose to tell the truth perhaps not knowing that the conduct
he was admitting to, constituted a crime. His honesty, at this stage,
might well have been his best defence, knowledge of unlawfulness
being an essential element of criminal liability. This does not appear
to have been his legal representative's reason for not intervening,
the reason for not intervening being a combination of surprise and a
particular understanding of legal ethics. Intervention would also not
have prevented the first admissions being tendered in evidence at trial
ie those made before Mr J could feasibly have intervened (whether
or not there was a delay in translation). That these factors were not
in the mind of Mr J does not detract from the possibility that a legal
representative could have made a strategic decision not to intervene.
The dictum of the Supreme Court of Appeal in Halgryn14 suggests
that a court should be very wary of making a finding of incompetence
in such circumstances.
Unbeknown to Mr J the best way of protecting his client was to do
nothing - as it rendered his client's statement inadmissible. In trying
to be consistent with his understanding of his ethical obligations he
inadvertently ensured the acquittal of his factually guilty client. Looked
at from a certain perspective his passive choice could be viewed as a
masterstroke in reconciling the best interests of his clients and his
ethical obligations. Of course this is mere sophistry - but it does bring
to the fore an uneasiness about the approach of the court in Saloman.
5 Infringement of a constitutional right
However, both the court and counsel's duty to uphold the constitution
excludes any act that might infringe an accused's constitutional right
from falling within counsel's discretion. Does the failure to actively
discourage an accused from co-operating with the police infringe
an accused's privilege against self-incrimination? If the privilege
against self-incrimination is negated when an accused voluntarily and
inadvertently makes an incriminating statement it follows that the police
should never take an incriminating statement from an unrepresented
14 Ibid.
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accused, because if the accused was competently represented he
would surely, on the court' s reasoning in Saloman, not have made
the statement. The waiver of the right to legal representation must
also be invalid as it would only have been made in the absence of
competent legal representation. It also follows that the police should
not take down an incriminating statement made by a person who has
legal representation, as the fact that they are making an incriminating
statement is an indication that they have not been competently
represented. A competent representative may well encourage his or
her client to make an incriminating statement thus providing a fool
proof ground for appeal. There can be no doubt that disallowing all
extra-curial admissions would be a very strong bulwark against the
infringement of the privilege against self-incrimination. However, it
is likely that this policy choice would further erode an already low
conviction rate and we need to ask whether such a stringent approach
is required by the constitutional right not to incriminate oneself and
whether it is in the public interest.
The privilege against self-incrimination in many instances will
enhance both the truth seeking function of the court and legitimacy.
It does so by reducing the risk of coercion producing unreliable
evidence and protecting accused persons from the indignity of being
subjected to coercive measures. In this way it also enhances procedural
fairness. The privilege against self-incrimination does not prohibit an
accused from making a statement. The making of an incriminating
statement cannot be viewed as undignified, as across cultures people
are encouraged to confess and to 'own' up is seen as a good thing.
However, the privilege against self-incrimination will clearly be
infringed if a statement is not made voluntarily.
Voluntariness was given a very restricted meaning at common
law,15 however, the Constitution requires a broader interpretation
and voluntariness must be viewed as excluding any influence that
might extinguish the accused's free will.16 Can it be argued that the
mere invocation of the criminal justice system on its own is sufficient
to negate any claim of voluntariness when a person makes an
incriminating statement? In an ideal world, where crime rates are not
flamed by gross inequality, where the police force is well-resourced
and well trained excluding all admissions might indeed be an effective
way of enhancing the truth seeking function of the court as well as
minimising incidences of abuse of state power. It also would not be a
novel approach (until the end of the 19th century the accused was not
a competent witness because he was viewed as an unreliable source of
15 R v Barlin 1926 AD 459.
16 S vAgnew 1996 (2) SACR 535 (C).
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evidence).17 However, we do not live in that world and voluntariness
(in the broadest sense - so as to encompass the absence of undue
influence) has not been viewed by the courts as being extinguished by
the mere invocation of the criminal process.
If an important purpose of legal representation is to uphold the
privilege against self-incrimination then in determining whether
incompetent legal representation has undermined this right - the
question that should be asked is whether the accused's freedom of will
was extinguished. In Saloman's case there is nothing in the judgment
that indicates that the appellant was subject to any form of coercion
that might have compromised the exercise of his free will. But, did
his possible absence of knowledge of the unlawfulness of his conduct
constrain the exercise of his free will?
Intention to make an incriminating statement was not considered
a requirement for admissibility by the Appellate Division.18 It is
worth considering whether the recognition of the privilege against
self-incrimination as a constitutional right requires the maker of
an incriminating statement to know that the contents of his or her
statement are incriminating before the statement can be admitted
into evidence.
In interpreting 'free will' in the context of an accused who makes
a voluntary but inadvertently incriminating statement, a purposive
approach requires us to look at the rationale underlying the privilege
against self-incrimination which is 3-pronged: (a) concern for reliability
(by deterring improper investigation) which relates directly to the
truth-seeking function of the court; (b) a belief that individuals have
a right to privacy and dignity which, whilst not absolute, may not
be lightly eroded; (c) the privilege is necessary to give effect to the
presumption of innocence. Clearly, in Saloman's case neither (a) nor
(b) are applicable, (c) however, merits some discussion.
The presumption of innocence places a burden on the prosecution
to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. The accused has no
obligation to assist the prosecution, however, the prosecution is not
barred from using the accused as a source of evidence provided the
assistance is given voluntarily. In other words the privilege against
self-incrimination promotes the presumption of innocence by reducing
unreliability and protecting the rights to privacy and dignity. If free will
is interpreted in this context, absence of knowledge of unlawfulness,
does not extinguish the accused's exercise of his or her free will.
17 CK Allen Legal Duties and Other Essays in Jurisprudence (1931) 269.
18 R v Barlin supra; S v Grove-Mitchell 1975 (3) SA 417 (A). Cf S v Buda 2004 (1) SACR
9 (T).
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6 Section 35(5) of the Constitution
Saloman requires us to ask another question. When a voluntary but
inadvertently incriminating statement could have been curtailed by
the intervention of a legal representative could the trial nevertheless
be unfair on the basis that the accused was denied the right to a
competent legal representative? In other words, if incompetent legal
representation does not result in an infringement of the privilege
against self-incrimination, will it nevertheless render the trial unfair
simply by virtue of the fact that the right to legal representation is
included as fair trial requirement in s 35 of the Constitution.
Section 35 of the Constitution protects the rights of arrested,
detained and accused persons. Section 35(3) specifically protects the
right to a fair trial and contains a detailed but not a closed list of
the factors that form part of the right to a fair trial. Section 35(5) of
the Constitution requires that evidence must be excluded if (i) it was
obtained in violation of the right to a fair trial and (ii) its admission
would render the trial unfair or otherwise be detrimental to the
administration of justice. Once it has been established that evidence
was obtained in breach of a constitutional right then the court must
determine whether the admission of that evidence would render the
trial unfair. It is required to make a value judgment.
19
The meaning of trial fairness was eloquently set out by the
Constitutional Court in S v Zuma and S v Dzukuda, S v Tshilo.
21
As was said by the court in Zuma's case, an accused's right to a fair
trial under s 35(3) of the Constitution is a comprehensive right and
'embraces a concept of substantive fairness which is not to be equated
with what might have passed muster in our criminal courts before the
Constitution came into force'. Elements of this comprehensive right
are specified in paragraphs (a) to (o) of subsec (3). The words 'which
include the right' preceding this listing indicate that such specification
is not exhaustive of what the right to a fair trial comprises. It also
does not warrant the conclusion that the right to a fair trial consists
merely of a number of discrete sub-rights, some of which have been
specified in the subsection and others not. The right to a fair trial is
a comprehensive and integrated right, the content of which will be
established, on a case by case basis, as our constitutional jurisprudence
on s 35(3) develops. It is preferable, in this author's view, that in
order to give proper recognition to the comprehensive and integrated
nature of the right to a fair trial, to refer to specified and unspecified
elements of the right to a fair trial, the specified elements being those
19 See SE van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe op cit (nl) 226.
20 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC).
21 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC).
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detailed in subsec (3). It would be imprudent, even if it were possible,
in a particular case concerning the right to a fair trial, to attempt
a comprehensive exposition thereof. In what follows, no more is
intended to be said about this particular right than is necessary to
decide the case at hand.
At the heart of the right to a fair criminal trial and what infuses
its purpose, is for justice to be done and also to be seen to be done.
But the concept of justice itself is a broad and protean concept. In
considering what, for purposes of this case, lies at the heart of a fair
trial in the field of criminal justice, one should bear in mind that
dignity, freedom and equality are the foundational values of our
constitution. An important aim of the right to a fair criminal trial is
to adequately ensure that innocent people are not wrongly convicted,
because of the adverse effects which a wrong conviction has on the
liberty, and dignity (and possibly other) interests of the accused.
There are, however, other elements of the right to a fair trial such
as, for example, the presumption of innocence, the right to free legal
representation in given circumstances, a trial in public which is not
unreasonably delayed, which cannot be explained exclusively on the
basis of averting a wrong conviction, but which arise primarily from
considerations of dignity and equality.
22
The broad formulation of the right to a fair trial in S v Zuma23 and
S v Dzukuda2 4 provides grounds for arguing that even if one of the
discrete sub-rights enumerated in s 35(3) as a component of the right
to a fair trial is infringed, the admission of the evidence procured as
a result of such an infringement will not necessarily render the trial
unfair. Although it can be argued that this approach requires a degree
of agility in separating two inquiries - namely (a) has a requirement
for a fair trial been breached and (b) will admission of the evidence
obtained as a result of the fair trial breach render the trial unfair
- the courts have clearly shown themselves capable of meeting this
challenge.
25
In determining whether the admission of evidence will render a trial
unfair, the court will take into account a complex matrix of competing
and complementary factors including competing societal interests. In
Lawrie v Muir, Lord Cooper expressed the conflict as follows:
'From the standpoint of principle it seems to me that the law must strive
to reconcile two highly important interests which are liable to come into
22 S v Dzukuda; S v Tshilo 2000 (2) SACR 443 (CC) at paras [9] and [11].
23 1995 (1) SACR 568 (CC).
24 Supra.
25 See S v Lottering 1999 (12) BCLR 1478 (N); S v Madiba 1998 (1) BCLR 38 (D); Key v
Attorney-General, Cape Provincial Division 1996 (4) SACR 113 (CC); S v M 2002 (2)
SACR 411 (SCA); S vNgcobo 1998 (10) BCLR 1248 (N).
Professional incompetence, voluntariness and the right to a fair
trial 303
conflict - (a) the interest of the citizen to be protected from illegal or
irregular invasions of his liberties by the authorities, and (b) the interest of
the State to secure that evidence bearing upon the commission of crime and
necessary to enable justice to be done shall not be withheld from the Courts
of law on merely formal or technical grounds.'
26
Others factors that the court will take into account include: the type and
degree of breach 27; the type and degree of prejudice to the accused -
if any;28 and public policy.29 Much has been written on section 35(5)
in the last twenty years30 and this article will not be canvassing this
jurisprudence. The summary so far, provides a sufficient backdrop
for considering whether incompetent legal representation on its own
negates the right to a fair trial.
The rationale for legal representation in a criminal trial is that it is
necessary in order for the accused to assert his or her constitutional
rights. In the absence of a constitutional right being infringed as a
consequence of incompetent legal representation there is a need to
consider what other prejudice the accused might suffer. If the accused
is prejudiced, the absence of competent representation will be sufficient
to render the trial unfair. Again using the facts in Saloman, where the
impact of a legal representative's incompetence appears to have been
restricted to the making of a voluntary but inadvertently incriminating
statement by the appellant, how would this prejudice the accused?
The forbidden prejudice is procedural prejudice, the accused cannot
be said to be prejudiced because he or she is found guilty or solely on
the basis that he or she makes an incriminating statement. If this were
the case, as argued above, the police would not be able to introduce
any incriminating statements made by the accused into evidence, nor
could the courts accept a plea of guilty, in the absence of coercion
or trickery it is difficult to identify the existence of any procedural
prejudice. The appellant knew that he need not make a statement,
and if he did so that what he said would be used against him. He
chose to tell an exculpatory version to his legal representative and an
inculpatory version to the police - the only grounds for transferring
the risk of this peculiar behaviour on the part of the accused to the
prosecution is if unfairness ensued from not properly understanding
the legal consequences of his actions. However, he found himself in that
position as a consequence of his own mendacity not as a consequence
26 1950 SC (J) 16, 26-27. See eg S v Soci 1998 (2) SACR 275 (E).
27 S v Seseane 2000 (2) SACR 225 (0); S v Mphala 1998 (1) SACR 388 (W); S v Lottering
supra.
28 S v Soci supra; S v Lottering supra.
29 Ibid.
30 See for example, SE van der Merwe in Schwikkard & Van der Merwe Ch 12; and DT
Zeffertt and AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2ed (2009) Ch 18.
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of any coercion or trickery on the part of the state. Having made it
impossible for his legal representative to give appropriate legal advice
in the first place, it is difficult to find a policy reason for not requiring
him to carry the risk of his own mendacity. In the absence of such a
policy reason there could be no unfairness in requiring the accused to
accept the risk he had taken.
Would it have made any difference if the appellant had given an
inculpatory account of his behaviour to his legal representative and his
legal representative had explained to the appellant his rights and the
consequences of making a statement but did not actively discourage
his client from making a statement? The Saloman judgment indicates
that this would be a prima facie indication of incompetence, and a
legal representative would then have to explain to the court why he or
she had taken this route, for example in the hope that his or her client
would get a lesser sentence or be more credible when they raised a
defence of the absence of knowledge of unlawfulness. It also suggests
that professional ethics requires legal representatives to discourage
their clients from co-operating with the police - if this is so - it is
difficult to identify the constitutional right that supports such an
approach to professional ethics. The presumption of innocence places
no obligation on the accused to assist the prosecution (including the
police) however, it does not require the absence of co-operation and
there may be both utilitarian and ethical reasons for an accused to
assist in the truth-seeking function of the court.
7 Another scenario
If all of the above arguments to the effect that the privilege against
self-incrimination is not infringed when an accused makes a voluntary
but inadvertently inculpatory statement are fallacious then there is a
need to consider whether this was sufficient to justify the exclusion of
the accused's statement in terms of s 35(5) of the Constitution. A breach
of the privilege against self-incrimination is generally considered a
serious breach as it is undoubtedly the corner stone of the right to a
fair trial. However, the arguments set out above can also be used to
support the contention that in the absence of coercion or trickery any
prejudiced suffered by the accused is so minimal as to be insufficient to
render the trial unfair. Would such a breach nevertheless be sufficient
to make the admission of the voluntary statement detrimental to the
administration of justice? It is unlikely that a conviction would cause
public distress whereas an acquittal might - however, the potential
public response correctly carries very little weight as court decisions
should serve an educational purpose. The educational message from
Saloman is directed at lawyers and appears to be that you have a duty
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to zealously place your client's interests above all else and if you do
not they will be acquitted and your reputation tarnished. Of course
this author is not overlooking the more serious message namely, that
a court's duty is to uphold an accused's constitutional rights and it is
irrelevant if they are guilty. That is an important message - however, if
constitutional rights are not upheld with reference to their underlying
rationale the criminal process will be viewed as irrational with the
concomitant risk that the rights protected by the Bill of Rights will lose
the critical legitimacy that they require.
8 Conclusion
Applying Halgryn, where a course of action lies within the discretion
of a legal representative, a court should be cautious before making a
finding of incompetence. In making an assessment of what professional
ethics demands of a legal practitioner the court should bear in mind
that it is required to promote the spirit, purport and objects of the Bill
of Rights which in turn are underpinned by the values of ubuntu as
discussed earlier. These values may well require the courts to place
more emphasis on the general public interest than would be the case
in a jurisdiction where a high value is placed on individualism in
contrast to communitarian principles. However, where incompetence
results in the substantive infringement of a constitutional right the
accused should be entitled to an appropriate remedy which depending
on the circumstances might be the exclusion of evidence. Individual
rights will always be important, however, their reach should not be
extended beyond their rationale.
